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MARRIAGE EQUALITY COMES TO VIRGINIA
Carl Tobias *
INTRODUCTION
Marriage equality is sweeping the United States. Across 2014,
numerous federal circuit and district court judges throughout
America invalidated state constitutional bans or legislative re-
strictions which proscribe same-sex marriage. Accordingly, it was
predictable that Judge Wright Allen of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia would rule that Virgin-
ia's prohibitions were unconstitutional and enjoin their enforce-
ment on February 13,' even as the jurist stayed her decision.2
Marriage equality in Virginia comprises a significant legal issue
and has telling effects on numerous people, but its status re-
mained less than clear until recently. Marriage equality in the ju-
risdiction deserves analysis, which this piece undertakes.
Part I of this article chronicles marriage equality's rise and de-
velopment nationally. It ascertains that challenges, which fos-
tered the invalidation of marriage prohibitions that essentially
govern nearly all jurisdictions, including Virginia, have triggered
some controversy. Part II scrutinizes Judge Wright Allen's resolu-
tion of the Virginia litigation and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit determination, which affirmed her
ruling. This portion finds that the district jurist comprehensively
assessed the relevant legal and factual issues when striking down
* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank
Peggy Sanner for exceptional ideas, Thomas DiStanislao and Katie Lehnen for valuable
research, Leslee Stone for excellent processing, and Russell Williams and the Hunton Wil-
liams Summer Endowment Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are
mine.
1. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483-85 (E.D. Va. 2014); see Robert Barnes,
Federal Judge Strikes Down Va. Ban on Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-judge-strikes-down-va-ban-on-gay-marriage/201
4/02/13/c65b7674-9528- 1 1e3-83b9-1f024193bb84story.html?hpid=zl.
2. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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the proscription while the Fourth Circuit appropriately upheld
her opinion. Part III then derives lessons from the story recount-
ed because it ascertains that marriage equality in Virginia has
clarified, even as the national landscape continues to be relatively
unclear. Part IV proffers suggestions for the future.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY
A. United States v. Windsor
The history of marriage equality warrants comparatively lim-
ited review in this article because others have thoroughly ex-
plored the background,' and the current situation is most im-
portant. The 2013 United States v. Windsor Supreme Court
opinion' provoked the recent wave of marriage equality lawsuits,
while that determination has concomitantly figured prominently
in the rulings which numerous appellate and district court judges
have authored invalidating the bans.' The litigation has appar-
ently been organic, with challenges pursued in all of the states
that prohibit same-sex marriage.!
The Windsor majority held that section three in the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA") violated the Fourteenth Amendment.! It
was unclear about the proper level of scrutiny, but the majority
seemed to deploy elevated, albeit less than strict, scrutiny.' The
Court found insufficient justification for the imposition on dignity
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET (1999); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013); MARC SOLOMON,
WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How SAME-SEX COUPLES TOOK ON THE
POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS-AND WON (2014).
4. 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
5. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 870-74 (2014).
6. The ACLU has pursued much litigation, but local individuals and counsel have
filed a number of cases. David Boies and Theodore Olson assisted Virginia counsel in the
Eastern District suit, while the ACLU filed the Western District case. Harris v. Rainey,
299 F.R.D. 486 (W.D. Va. 2014); see Robert Barnes, Second Judge Ponders Virginia's
Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/pol
itics/second-judge-ponders-virginias-same-sex-marriage-ban/201402/19/f930b3a6-9989-
11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html.
7. See 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2696; see Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown:
Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 140 (2013).
8. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96; Franklin, supra note 5, at 872.
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that DOMA exacted and believed the injury visited upon same-
sex couples and their children was troubling.' While the majority
failed to specifically mention state-level bans, it waxed eloquent
about the value of federalism.o This treatment left unclear pre-
cisely what effect, if any, Windsor had on the state proscriptions,
although marriage equality champions seized upon the opinion
when attacking bans and courts relied on Windsor to invalidate
prohibitions. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ex-
pressly remarked that the question of state marriage laws' consti-
tutionality was not before the Court," while Justice Scalia
agreed, but contended that the arguments employed when invali-
dating DOIA could similarly apply to state proscriptions." On
the same day, the Court did not reach the merits of an appeal
that sought to invalidate California's ban, as a majority found the
petitioners lacked standing to appeal.
B. The Federal Challenges to State Bans
Twenty-seven district courts have fully invalidated prohibitions
and several others have partially done so, but only Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana and District of Puerto Rico judges have found
bans constitutional. 4 The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have affirmed district court opinions, even as the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee decisions
striking down proscriptions in a case which the Justices agreed to
hear on January 16, 2015." However, appeals currently are pend-
9. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95.
10. Id.; see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
11. Windsor, 570 U.S. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Mar-
man, supra note 7, at 158.
12. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Franklin,
supra note 5, at 870.
13. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. _ 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit's Perry Decision and the Constitutional Poli-
tics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012) (discussing the merits of Per-
ry in the lower court where the Ninth Circuit struck down California's Proposition 8 on
equal protection grounds), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/onlinelperry-
marriage-equality.
14. Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 2014 WL 5361987 at *11 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014);
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927-28 (E.D. La. 2014); see ALLIANCE FOR
JUSTICE, FEDERAL CHALLENGES TO STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS (2015), available at
http://www.afj.org/reports/latest-updates-love-and-the-law.
15. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
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ing before the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits."6
The jurists who invalidated bans found that they violated due
process or equal protection with most applying a form of height-
ened scrutiny."
In December 2013, a Utah district judge issued the first opin-
ion that rejected a ban." The next month, an Oklahoma trial
court jurist struck down the state's ban." During February 2014,
a Texas district court judge, as well as Judge Wright Allen of the
Eastern District of Virginia, invalidated those jurisdictions' pro-
hibitions." The following month, a Michigan jurist deemed its ban
unconstitutional." In May, district courts in Idaho, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania overturned the states' restrictions.22 During June,
Indiana and Wisconsin judges ascertained that the jurisdictions'
bans were unconstitutional." In July, Colorado and Kentucky ju-
rists invalidated those states' prohibitions. During August, a
Florida judge found its ban violated the Constitution.2' Through-
out October, Alaska, Arizona, North Carolina, and Wyoming ju-
F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014); Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct.
271 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-136). The Sixth Circuit consolidated the Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Ohio, and Tennessee decisions in a case styled as DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th
Cir. 2014). These decisions were Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014),
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), Obergefell V. Wymyslo, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2014), and Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to each on January 16, 2015. Bourke v. Beshear,
135 S. Ct. 1041 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-574); DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No.
14-556); Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-562).
16. See Conde-Vidal, 2014 WL 5361987, at *10-11; Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No.
4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. 2015); supra note 12; infra notes 18,
20, 25, 28 and accompanying text.
17. This article emphasizes the Fourth Circuit opinion. See infra Part II.B.
18. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013).
19. Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
20. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970
F. Supp. 2d 456, 483-84 (E.D. Va. 2014).
21. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
22. See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1060 (D. Idaho 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber,
994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415
(M.D. Pa. 2014). A magistrate judge ruled in the Idaho case.
23. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986
F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
24. See Burns v. Hickenlooper, 2014 WL 3634834, at *5 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014);
Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
25. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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rists ruled the states' proscriptions unconstitutional.2 6 In Novem-
ber, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, and
South Carolina judges held bans invalid.2 ' During January 2015,
Alabama and South Dakota jurists struck down limitations, and
in March, a Nebraska judge invalidated a ban." A number of the-
se decisions remain on appeal. For example, the Fifth Circuit
heard oral arguments in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas
appeals on January 9,29 Alabama and Florida appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit,"o and Idaho and Alaska sought en banc review
from the Ninth Circuit."
District judges in a few jurisdictions have partially invalidated
bans, essentially requiring the states to recognize same-sex mar-
riages valid in states where they occurred. The Indiana and Ken-
tucky jurists broadened their earlier partial, into complete, inval-
26. See Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-cv-00089-TMB, 2014 WL 5089399, at *1 (D.
Alaska Oct. 12, 2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315 (D. Ariz. 2014); General
Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791 (W.D.N.C.
2014); Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (M.D.N.C. 2014); Guzzo v. Mead,
No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014).
27. See Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13-cv-00410, 2014 WL 6685391, at *24 (E.D. Ark.
Nov. 25, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TJJ, 2014 WL 5598128, at *1 (D.
Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014
WL 6680570, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS,
2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227,
1235 (D. Mont. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 576 (D.S.C. 2014).
28. See Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan.
23, 2015); Waters v. Ricketts, No. 8:14CV356, 2015 WL 852603, at *16 (D. Neb. Mar. 2,
2015); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2015 WL 144567, at *11
(D.S.D. Jan. 12, 2015).
29. Lauren McGaughy, Social Issues; Appeals Court Hearing Buoys Same-Sex Mar-
riage Advocates, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2015, at Al; Andy Grimm, Appeals Judges Ask
More Questions from Gay Marriage Opponents at Hearing on Louisiana's Ban, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/louisianagay marriage appea
1s.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2015, 1:09 AM); see supra notes 12, 18.
30. Katie Lepri, Florida Begins Appeal of Decision Allowing Same-Sex Marriage,
MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/gay-
south-florida/article3955145.html; Lyle Denniston, Eleventh Circuit Puts Off Same-Sex
Marriage Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/
02/eleventh-circuit-puts-off-same-sex-marriage-cases/.
31. Chris Johnson, Idaho, Alaska Seek Full Ninth Circuit Review of Marriage Rulings,
WASH. BLADE (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/10/23/idaho-alaska-
seek-full-ninth-circuit-review-marriage-rulings/; Pamela MacLean, Alaska Loses Round in
Gay Marriage Appeal, TRIAL INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.trialinsider.com?p=
5321; Larger 9th Circuit Panel Won't Rehear Idaho Gay Marriage Case, IDAHO STATESMAN
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.idahostatesman.com/2015/01/09/3582910/larger-9th-circuit-pan
el-wont.html.
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idations." A few Ohio and Tennessee district judges partially
struck down the states' bans."
Many district jurists have relied on similar reasoning, with a
number citing earlier cases in other districts. They found that the
bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment, more specifically its
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause." The judges were less
uniform when deciding the level of scrutiny that should apply.
Most employed various forms of heightened scrutiny, a few explic-
itly adopted strict scrutiny and some used the rational basis
test."
On October 6, 2014, the Justices denied seven petitions for cer-
tiorari seeking review of the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit
decisions." This rejection governed similar prohibitions in other
states of those circuits where the districts had not invalidated the
bans. The Supreme Court's denial led government officials from
Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming to permit marriages, even as their counterparts in Alaska,
Kansas, North Carolina, and South Carolina persisted in defend-
ing these jurisdictions' restrictions." Challenges have been filed
32. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Love v. Beshear,
989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
33. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14; Amanda Holpuch, Gay Marriage Is Le-
gal in 32 States-But What About the Other 18?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/27/gay-marriage-legal-us-states.
34. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits used due process. The Seventh and Ninth used
equal protection. See supra note 13.
35. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits used heightened scrutiny, and many judges found
no rational basis for the bans. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v.
Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464-65 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144,
1163 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (concluding that the Indiana 'law fail[ed] rational basis review").
36. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v.
Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No.
14-277); Walker v. Wolf, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-278); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub. nom. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-136); Kitchen v. Her-
bert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct.
265 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-124). The Supreme Court also separately denied certiorari
to the consolidated cases in Bostic v. Schaefer. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (U.S. Oct.
6, 2014) (No. 14-251); Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-153); see
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2014, at Al.
37. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14; Holpuch, supra note 33.
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with district courts in Georgia and North Dakota, but they are
pending resolution."
In short, the overwhelming majority of circuit and district court
judges across the nation, who resolved the question of whether
same-sex marriage bans violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause, determined that the pro-
scriptions were unconstitutional. A number of these jurists con-
comitantly applied some form of elevated scrutiny. The next sec-
tion of this article evaluates the Virginia litigation by first
analyzing Judge Wright Allen's district court treatment, which
struck down Virginia's marriage laws, and then scrutinizing the
Fourth Circuit opinion, which affirmed her decision.
II. THE VIRGINIA LITIGATION
In July 2013, plaintiffs challenged the Virginia prohibitions
and the case was assigned to Judge Wright Allen." She conducted
preliminary hearings, set a briefing schedule, and held oral ar-
guments on the legal issues that the challenge raised." On Feb-
ruary 14, the jurist issued a twenty-four-page opinion that invali-
dated the proscriptions and enjoined their application, but issued
a stay pending the appeal's resolution.4
A. The Eastern District Opinion
1. Introduction
Judge Wright Allen commenced her opinion by invoking Loving
v. Virginia, which sounded a theme particularly resonant for the
Commonwealth. She began with a quotation from Mildred Lov-
ing:
I believe all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no
matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to
38. See supra note 34; Chris Johnson, Court Halts Same-Sex Marriage Lawsuits in
North Dakota, WASH. BLADE (Jan. 20, 2015), available at www.washingtonblade.com/2015
/01/20/court-halts-sex-marriage-lawsuits-north-dakota/.
39. Court Docket for Bostic v. McDonnell, No. 2:13-cv-00395AWA-LRL (E.D. Va. July
18, 2013).
40. Id.
41. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014).
11992015]
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marry. Government has no business imposing some people's reli-
gious beliefs over others. . . . I support the freedom to marry for all.42That's what Loving, and loving are all about.
The jurist observed that a spirited, controversial debate about
who enjoys the right to marry in America was underway.43 She
found that the United States had pursued a difficult and some-
times "painful and poignant" journey to make and keep its citi-
zens free, while the ultimate exercise of freedom is choice.4 The
judge stated that one of the courts' noblest endeavors is scrutiniz-
ing laws, which are "rooted in unlawful prejudice."45 Judge Wright
Allen stated the plaintiffs' claim that Virginia's proscriptions "on
their freedom to choose to marry the person they love infringes on
the rights to due process and equal protection. She applied
heightened scrutiny and determined that Virginia's laws banning
same-sex marriages violated both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Preliminary Issues
In July 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the former Governor and Attorney General of Vir-
ginia, as well as the Clerk of the Norfolk Circuit Court, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and a finding that Virginia's
marriage laws violate due process and equal protection.4 ' The ju-
rist recounted that the General Assembly revised the Virginia
Code in 1997 to prohibit "marriage between persons of the same
sex" and render every same-sex marriage entered into elsewhere
"void in all respects in Virginia."49 During 2004, after successful
challenges to same-sex marriage prohibitions in other states, the
Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex
42. Id. at 460 (citing Mildred Loving, Loving for All, Public Statement on the 40th
Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia (June 12, 2007)). I use the terms Virginia and Com-
monwealth interchangeably in this article.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 461.
47. Id. at 473, 484.
48. Id. at 461. The primary focus here is VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A, the ban voters ap-
proved in 2006. See id. at 461 n.2.
49. Id. at 464 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2008)).
1200 [Vol. 49:1193
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marriage, which the voters ratified in 2006.o In late January, de-
fendant Janet Rainey, the State Registrar of Vital Records, to-
gether with the Attorney General, tendered a change in position,
relinquishing her previous defense of the laws."
3. Standard of Review
Judge Wright Allen next considered Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56's articulation that "summary judgment is proper 'if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,"'
as defined and elaborated by two major 1986 Supreme Court
opinions.52 She then observed that a plaintiff who seeks a "prelim-
inary injunction must establish a likelihood of success on the
merits, that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in the plaintiffs favor, and that an injunction is in the public in-
",51terest.
4. Analysis
a. Preliminary Challenges
The jurist considered the assertion that the plaintiffs lacked
standing by evaluating the requirements of injury in fact, causal
connection, and redressability while easily concluding that plain-
tiff met the strictures." Judge Wright Allen next examined the
defendants' claim that the Supreme Court's summary disposition,
"for want of a substantial federal question," in the 1972 case of
Baker v. Nelson precluded her exercise of jurisdiction." She, as
50. Id. at 464-65. It also passed the Affirmation of Marriage Act, which proscribed
civil unions, partnerships and other arrangements between same-sex couples and voided
in Virginia those arrangements made in other states. Id. at 465 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
20-45.3 (2008)).
51. Id. at 461-62 ("Intervenor-Defendant was granted leave to adopt Ms. Rainey's pri-
or motion and briefs in support of that motion.").
52. Id. at 465-466 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586-87 (1986)).
53. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 466-68.
55. Id. at 468-70 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972)).
12012015]1
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many other judges deciding marriage equality lawsuits, conclud-
ed that "doctrinal developments since 1971 compell[ed] the con-
clusion that Baker is no longer binding."
b. Constitutional Challenges
i. Due Process Clause
The judge initially observed that "all fundamental rights com-
prised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Con-
stitution from invasion by the States." 7 She declared "there can
be no serious doubt that in America the right to marry is a rigor-
ously protected fundamental right[, as the Court] has recognized
repeatedly that marriage is a fundamental right protected by
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses."" The jurist
elaborated that the "right to marry is inseparable from our rights
to privacy and intimate association," reciting the paean to "mar-
riage's noble purposes" in the landmark Supreme Court Griswold
v. Connecticut opinion." She then considered, and summarily re-
jected, the assertion that plaintiffs sought to "create and exercise
a new[] right" because the couples were asking for the same right
which heterosexuals enjoy: making a "'public commitment to form
an exclusive relationship and create a family with a partner with
whom the person shares an intimate and sustaining emotional
bond."'60 Virginia's marriage laws "interject profound government
interference into one of the most personal" sacred choices persons
make; the nature of the "interference compels careful judicial ex-
amination" to ensure the choices are "free from unwarranted gov-
ernment interference."
56. Id. at 469. She invoked the Second Circuit's Windsor opinion and the Utah dis-
trict's Kitchen v. Herbert case. Id. at 469-70; see supra notes 12, 18, 23, 25, 28 and accom-
panying text; see also infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
57. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 470-71. She cited many classic cases, such as Loving. See id. at 471.
59. Id. at 471 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
60. Id. at 472 (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1202-03 (D. Utah
2013)); see also id. ("This right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty because it protects an individual's ability to make deeply per-
sonal choices about love and family free from government interference.") (quoting Kitchen,
961 F. Supp. 2d at 1203).
61. Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
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The jurist found that state regulations are generally presumed
valid and upheld when "rationally related to a legitimate state in-
terest," but that closer scrutiny applies to "'those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed."' 2 Employing strict scrutiny, she observed
that "regulations pass constitutional muster only if they are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."" Because
Judge Wright Allen deemed marriage a fundamental right, she
proceeded to assess the major justifications offered for Virginia's
laws to ascertain whether they were compelling and closely tai-
lored.64
The judge first analyzed traditions and the claim of the laws'
advocates that the prohibitions discourage people from abusing
marriage rights by marrying to qualify for benefits and concluded
it lacked "any rational basis."" She found this interest was not
advanced by excluding a segment of people from marriage based
on sexual orientation.66 Judge Wright Allen then said that court
evaluation must stress the laws' history, which prompted the "in-
escapable conclusion" that the state's interest was to "avoid 'radi-
cal changes' that would [diminish a] long-held view" of marriage,
but "the Supreme Court has rejected the assertion that a prevail-
ing moral conviction can, alone, justify upholding a constitution-
ally infirm law."" She announced that practically identical con-
cerns were considered and resolved by the Court in Loving, which
invalidated Virginia's interracial marriage ban despite its pro-
tracted existence." The jurist stated that tradition is revered in
Virginia, but it could not support "denying same-sex couples the
right to marry any more than it could justify Virginia's ban on in-
terracial marriage."69
62. Id. at 473 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. See id. at 473-80 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 474. A legal concept's ancient lineage does not immunize it "from attack for
lacking a rational basis." Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 474-75 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
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Judge Wright Allen explored the second interest, federalism,
which proponents asserted. The jurist invoked Windsor's pro-
tracted exposition on federal government deference to state law
policymaking that implicates domestic relations while declaring
she was mindful that federal intervention was best exercised
rarely and domestic relations powers appropriately rest with
states and localities." However, she proclaimed that federal
courts have properly intervened when state regulations infringed
the fundamental right to marry and Windsor's "citation to Loving
is a disclaimer of enormous proportion" because it signaled that
"due process and equal protection guarantees must trump objec-
tions to federal intervention."" The jurist observed that Windsor
invoked the Constitution to protect gay and lesbian citizens' indi-
vidual rights, and the propriety of applying that protection re-
mained compelling when assessing state laws' constitutionality.7 2
Judge Wright Allen found meritless the proponents' related
claim that the judiciary must suspend intervention in deference
to possible action by the General Assembly or the people because
the contention ignored the continuing injury Virginia gay and
lesbian citizens suffered and the "stigma, humiliation and preju-
dice that would be visited upon" their children while awaiting
change." The judge declared that courts must act "when core civil
rights are at stake" and "[i]ntervention under the circumstances
presented ... is warranted, and compelled."7 4
She next addressed the proponents' third rationale, "for-the-
children," which suggested that "responsible procreation and 'op-
timal child rearing' are legitimate interests that support" the ban;
however, this rationale failed the strict scrutiny and rational ba-
70. Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 476 (citation omitted).
72. Id. She, like the Utah district judge, invoked Justice Scalia's Windsor dissent. See
id.; Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013) (citing Justice Scalia's
dissent in Windsor); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("As I have said, the real rationale of [the Windsor opinion] is that DOMA is
motivated by bare ... desire to harm couples in same-sex marriages. How easy it is, in-
deed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-
sex couples marital status.").
73. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476-77 (E.D. Va. 2014). She noted the
lengthy, cumbersome revision process. Id. at 477 n.11.
74. Id. at 477. Despite the wisdom in usually deferring to states on domestic relations,
"judicial vigilance is a steady beacon searching for an ever-more perfect justice and truer
freedoms for our country's citizens." Id. (citation omitted).
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sis tests." Preventing same-sex marriages does not further this
interest, as the ban needlessly deprives thousands of children
whom same-sex couples rear of "the protection, the stability, the
recognition and the legitimacy that marriage conveys."7 6 The ju-
rist found that research clearly demonstrated "gay and lesbian
couples are as capable as other couples of raising well-adjusted
children."" Moreover, this rationale could not justify the ban, as
recognition of all gay and lesbian persons' "fundamental right to
marry can in no way influence whether other individuals will
marry, or how other individuals will raise families."7 The conten-
tion also failed because it would jeopardize the legitimacy of peo-
ple who do not procreate. Judge Wright Allen determined as
well that the rationale was premised "upon an unconstitutional,
hurtful and unfounded presumption that same-sex couples cannot
be good parents."0 Finally, she observed this assertion "miscon-
strues the dignity and values inherent in the fundamental right
to marry as primarily a vehicle for 'responsibly' breeding 'natural'
offspring" by ignoring the "profound non-procreative elements of
marriage."8 ' In summarizing, Judge Wright Allen believed that
"[t]he state's compelling interests in protecting and supporting
our children are not furthered by a prohibition against same-sex
marriage," which denies marriage's benefits, dignity, and value
simply because of a person's gender.8 2
ii. Equal Protection
The judge found that the marriage laws violated equal protec-
tion for the same reasons they contravened due process-the pro-
hibitions "significantly interfere with a fundamental right, and
are inadequately tailored to effectuate only" sufficiently im-
portant state interests." Even absent a determination that a fun-
75. Id. at 477-78.
76. Id. at 478.
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 478-79 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 479. "Attempting to legislate a state-sanctioned preference for one model of
parenting . .. is constitutionally infirm." Id.
81. Id. These included "expressions of emotional support and public commitment,"
"spiritual significance," and "expression of personal dedication." Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id.
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damental right was implicated, she declared they violated equal
protection because the laws treated differently persons "standing
in the same relation to" them."
Judge Wright Allen then examined the scrutiny that ought to
apply and found deference unwarranted, as she detected "reason-
able grounds to suspect 'prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.""' The jurist cited Lawrence for the proposition that
"powerful voices [have condemned] homosexual conduct as im-
moral" for centuries, moral condemnation she found, "continues
to manifest in Virginia in state-sanctioned activities."" Judge
Wright Allen canvassed the levels of scrutiny and concomitant
tests, ascertaining that "Virginia's Marriage Laws fail to display
a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose, and [thus are]
constitutionally infirm under even the least onerous level of scru-
tiny."" The judge admonished that she had "considered carefully"
and fully evaluated the purposes that advocates proffered but
found no rational link to the laws challenged." The measures'
goal and result was "to deprive Virginia's gay and lesbian citizens
of the opportunity and right to choose to celebrate, in marriage, a
loving, rewarding monogamous relationship with a partner to
whom they are committed for life.""
11. Conclusion
The judge maintained that "Virginia's laws [ensure] that mar-
riage provides profound legal, financial, and social benefits, and
exacts serious legal, financial, and social obligations."o However,
84. Id.
85. Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
86. Id. She invoked two recent examples. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 482. Thus, she "need[ed] not address Plaintiffs' compelling arguments that
the Laws should be subjected to heightened scrutiny," but would have been "inclined to so
find." Id. at 481-82 & n.16.
88. Id. at 482.
89. Id. "These results occur without furthering any legitimate state purpose." Id. She
found plaintiffs' "Section 1983 claims are well-taken" because she had invalidated the
marriage laws and there was adequate state action to grant relief under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 482-83.
90. Id. at 483.
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state involvement in defining and attaching benefits to marriage
"must withstand constitutional scrutiny, [while] laws that fail
that scrutiny must fall despite the depth and legitimacy of the
laws' religious heritage."" She was "compelled to conclude that
Virginia's marriage laws unconstitutionally deny Virginia's gay
and lesbian citizens the fundamental freedom to choose to mar-
ry," because the state's proffered interests must yield to America's
"cherished protections that ensure the exercise of the private
choices of the individual citizen regarding love and family."
The jurist deemed this resolution consistent with the country's
traditions of freedom, while its checkered "but dogged journey to-
ward [citizens'] truer and more meaningful freedoms" has contin-
ually brought the United States "to [a] deeper understanding of
the Constitution's initial three words: we the people."" She de-
clared that "[j]ustice has often been forged from fires of indigni-
ties and prejudices suffered," and that the nation's triumphs that
"celebrate the freedom of choice are hallowed."94 The judge pro-
claimed, "We have arrived upon another moment in history when
We the People becomes more inclusive and our freedom more per-
fect."" She invoked Abraham Lincoln's 1860 statement regarding
fairness, concluding that the men, women, and children "whose
voices join in noble harmony with Plaintiffs today, also ask for
fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as it is in this Court's
power, they and all others shall have.""
iv. Order
Judge Wright Allen found unconstitutional the marriage pro-
hibitions "and any other Virginia law that bars same-sex mar-
riage or prohibits Virginia's recognition of lawful same-sex mar-
riages from other jurisdictions" as violations of due process and
equal protection." She granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment
motion and enjoined the proscriptions, but stayed the injunction's
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. "'We the People' have become a broader, more diverse family than once imag-
ined." Id. (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 483-84.
95. Id. at 484.
96. Id. at 484 & n.20 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 484.
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execution in light of the High Court's decision to grant a stay in
the Utah marriage equality case styled Kitchen v. Herbert."
B. The Fourth Circuit Majority Opinion
The defendants and the Attorney General of Virginia swiftly
filed appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which granted their requests for expedited re-
view." The Fourth Circuit panel, which comprised Judges Nie-
meyer, Gregory, and Floyd, conducted a May 13 oral argument
that involved numerous spirited exchanges.' On July 28, the
court issued the opinion, which Judge Floyd authored for himself
and Judge Gregory, that affirmed the district court ruling, be-
cause Virginia's laws "impermissibly infringe on its citizens' fun-
damental right to marry," while Judge Niemeyer dissented.10'
1. Standing
The majority initially addressed whether the plaintiffs had
standing to pursue relief. Judge Floyd determined that the plain-
tiffs must "allege (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and that is (3) likely to be
redressed by the requested relief."'0 2 He found that denial of a
marriage license to the named plaintiff and his partner easily met
the standing requirements.1o0
98. Id.; see Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (granting stay); Herbert v. Kitch-
en, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); supra notes 12, 18, 23, 25, 28 and accompanying
text.
99. Markus Schmidt, In Procedural Step, Va. Appeals Marriage Case, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginialarticle-af8ldd88-9da4-
1 1e3-86ef-0017a43b2370.html.
100. Robert Barnes, Judges Divided On Va. Gay-Marriage Ban, WASH. POST, May 14,
2014, at A4; Adam Serwer, Divided Panel Hears Virginia Case for-and Against-Gay
Marriage, MSNBC (May 13, 2014, 3:33 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gay-marriage-
virginia-federal-court-ban.
101. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225).
102. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 371. That sufficed for standing, but he also found a second couple met the
strictures by showing tangible denial of benefits and stigmatic injuries traceable to the
laws' enforcement, which a declaration of unconstitutionally would redress. Id. at 372.
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2. Merits
a. Baker v. Nelson
Judge Floyd treated the Supreme Court's 1972 summary dispo-
sition in Baker v. Nelson"l4 similarly to virtually all of the other
judges, including Judge Wright Allen, who have addressed the
1972 opinion. The author, like the district jurist, relied on the Se-
cond Circuit Windsor opinion and the myriad other recent lower
court decisions."o' He remarked that the "Supreme Court's will-
ingness to decide Windsor without mentioning Baker speaks vol-
umes regarding whether Baker remains good law[, while] devel-
opment of its due process and equal protection jurisprudence in
the four decades following Baker is even more instructive."06 Af-
ter carefully scrutinizing that jurisprudence, the majority de-
clined to find Baker "binding precedent," given the Justices' seem-
ing abandonment of that case and the important doctrinal
developments subsequent to Baker.'7
b. Fourteenth Amendment
Judge Floyd initially stated that evaluation of the Fourteenth
Amendment claims includes two constituents. First, the court
must ascertain the precise level of constitutional scrutiny that
applies: "either rational basis review or some [type] of elevated
scrutiny, such as strict scrutiny."'o Second, the panel applies the
proper level to decide whether the Virginia marriage laws are
constitutional. "9
i. Level of Scrutiny
Judge Floyd declared that government interference with a fun-
damental right merits strict scrutiny under the Due Process and
104. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
105. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373-74, 376, 469 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub.
nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); see supra text ac-
companying note 56.
106. Id. at 374.
107. Id. at 374-75.
108. Id. at 375
109. Id.
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Equal Protection Clauses."o The jurist analyzed whether Virgin-
ia's marriage laws infringed on a fundamental right, which de-
rives "from the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of individual
liberty" that "includes the fundamental right to marry.""' The
marriage laws' proponents relied on Washington v. Glucksberg to
argue that the district court erred by not carefully describing the
alleged fundamental liberty interest."' However, the majority
found that "Glucksberg's analysis applies only when courts con-
sider whether to recognize new fundamental rights," so it was in-
applicable because the two judges concluded that the "fundamen-
tal right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage."",3
Judge Floyd maintained that over time the Justices had "demon-
strated that the right to marry is an expansive liberty interest
that may stretch to accommodate changing societal norms[,
p]erhaps most notably, in Loving, [which] invalidated a Virginia
law that prohibited white individuals from marrying individuals
of other races.""4
The panel found that Loving and related marriage cases "speak
of a broad right to marry," which reflects the Justices' conclusion
that the right "is a matter of 'freedom of choice' . . . that resides
with the individual.""' When the proponents remarked those cas-
es involved opposite-sex couples, so the Court might not grant
same-sex couples the same level of constitutional protection,
Judge Floyd urged that Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the
choices same-sex couples make enjoy identical constitutional pro-
tections as opposite-sex couples and, thus, refused to describe the
"right at issue in this case as the right to same sex-marriage.""6
In conclusion, he admonished that "[s]trict scrutiny applies on-
ly when laws 'significantly interfere with a fundamental right." "
However, the "Virginia Marriage Laws unquestionably satisfy
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 376.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 376-77 (citation omitted). The court also referenced Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978), in reaching
the conclusion that a fundamental right to marry exists.
116. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225).
117. Id. (citation omitted).
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this requirement: they impede the right to marry by preventing
same-sex couples from marrying and nullifying the legal import
of their out-of-state marriages," so strict scrutiny applied."'
ii. Application
When a court applies strict scrutiny, laws "may be justified on-
ly by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to
express only those interests.""' Proponents assume the burden of
demonstrating the challenged laws meet this standard, while
"they must rely on the laws' 'actual purpose[s]' rather than hypo-
thetical justifications." 120 The proponents offered five allegedly
compelling interests to support the laws that the majority evalu-
ated.
(1) Federalism
The panel invoked Windsor for the idea that throughout U.S.
"history, states have enjoyed the freedom to define and regulate
marriage as they see fit," while proponents cited Windsor in urg-
ing the court "to view Virginia's federalism-based interest in de-
fining marriage as a suitable justification for the Virginia Mar-
riage Laws.""' However, Judge Floyd claimed Windsor
undermined this position because the Court declared that "[s]tate
laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect
the constitutional rights of persons."122 He contended that Wind-
sor "reiterates Loving's admonition that the states must exercise
their authority without trampling constitutional guarantees[, so]
Virginia's federalism-based interest in defining marriage . . . can-
not justify its encroachment on the fundamental right to mar-
,1123ry.
Judge Floyd asserted the Supreme Court's recent Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action opinion did not alter the
118. Id.
119. Id. (citation omitted).
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 378.
122. Id. at 378-79 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2691 (2013) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967))).
123. Id. at 379.
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conclusion dictated by Windsor.124 Because the Schuette majority
emphasized the "need to respect the voters' policy choice" when
amending the state constitution,'2 5 which the Justices did not
closely scrutinize, the proponents urged its application to Virgin-
ia's voter-approved revision.126 However, the Fourth Circuit stated
that "the people's will is not an independent compelling interest
that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental
right to marry.""' Thus, the majority concluded "neither Virgin-
ia's federalism-based interest in defining marriage nor our re-
spect for the democratic process that codified that definition can
excuse the Virginia Marriage Laws' infringement of the right to
1,128marry.
(2) History and Tradition
Judge Floyd summarily rejected history and tradition "as a
compelling interest" to sustain the marriage laws.129 First, he de-
clared that the Justices had clearly stated that the "ancient line-
age of a legal concept does not give it immunity from attack,"
even under rational basis review,' while Lawrence made similar-
ly infirm the closely related notion of promoting moral princi-
ples.' 1 "Preserving the historical and traditional status quo [was
thus] not a compelling interest that justifies the Virginia Mar-
riage Laws."'32
(3) Safeguarding the Institution of Marriage
The proponents argued that deviation from the "tradition of
opposite-sex marriage [would] destabilize the institution of mar-
riage" by severing the connection between marriage and procrea-
tion. 13 Judge Floyd remarked that, even if the panel were to view
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 379-80.
129. Id. at 380.
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the theories proffered "through rose-colored glasses," they were
"unfounded for two key reasons."134 First, the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut rejected the notion that marriage was on-
ly about procreation by upholding "married couples' right not to
procreate and articulat[ing] a view of marriage that has nothing
to do with children."' Second, the proponents mainly based their
theory on the legacy of no-fault divorce, which the judge described
as a "wholly unrelated legal change to marriage."' Although
Judge Floyd stated this modification certainly altered married
life's realities "by making it easier for couples to end their rela-
tionships," he saw "no reason to think that legalizing same-sex
marriage will have a similar destabilizing effect.""' Indeed, the
majority found it more logical that same-sex couples desire access
to marriage so they might capitalize on its hallmarks-namely
faithfulness and permanence-and that permitting "loving, com-
mitted same-sex couples to marry and recognizing their out-of-
state marriages will strengthen the institution of marriage."
iv. Responsible Procreation
The proponents also claimed that the marriage laws, by per-
mitting only opposite-sex marriages, "provide stability [for] the
kinds of relationships which lead to unplanned pregnancies," thus
"avoiding or diminishing the negative outcomes frequently asso-
ciated with unintended children.""' However, the majority found
that the laws were not properly tailored to advance this interest
because they were "woefully underinclusive" in that "[s]ame-sex
couples are not the only category of couples who cannot reproduce
accidentally."O Judge Floyd analogized the laws' extreme under-
inclusivity to the permit stricture in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., which the Supreme Court found so underin-
clusive that it must have been premised on "'an irrational preju-
134. Id. He recognized in some cases substantial deference was owed to the Assembly's
predictive judgments. Id.
135. Id. Judge Floyd, like Judge Allen, cited Griswold's classic description. Id. (citation
omitted); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
136. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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dice,' rendering the law unconstitutional" and leading the Bostic
majority "to draw the same conclusion."'4' Judge Floyd deter-
mined the responsible procreation contention also failed because
strict scrutiny mandated that a "state's means further its compel-
ling interest."142 Therefore, he found that barring "same-sex cou-
ples from marrying and ignoring their out-of-state marriages did
not serve Virginia's goal of preventing out-of-wedlock births."'
v. Optimal Childrearing
The proponents argued that children developed best when
reared by their married biological parents in a stable family unit
and emphasized the importance of "gender-differentiated parent-
ing," and hence the laws "safeguard children by preventing same-
sex couples from marrying and starting inferior families."' The
majority found "extremely persuasive" the arguments proffered
by opponents and their amici that "there is no scientific evidence
that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual orienta-
tion... [and the laws] actually harm the children of same-sex
couples by stigmatizing their families and robbing them of the
stability, economic security, and togetherness that marriage fos-
ters."'
However, the jurist found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute
because the proponents' contention faltered "for at least two other
reasons.""' First, under elevated scrutiny, states cannot sustain
laws with 'overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities or preferences of' the groups in question."4 7 Second,
heightened "scrutiny requires congruity between a law's means
and its end[, which] is absent here."'4 Because each of the propo-
nents' justifications for the laws failed, they could not survive
strict scrutiny. 49
141. Id. at 382 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 383.
145. Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 23, Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 147-1167)).
146. Id. at 384.
147. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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In conclusion, the majority stated that Virginia's prohibitions
contravened the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and,
thus, affirmed the district court's summary judgment grant and
injunction.5 0 Judge Floyd recognized that "same-sex marriage
makes some people deeply uncomfortable[, but] inertia and ap-
prehension are not legitimate bases for denying same-sex couples
due process and equal protection . . . .""' Because the choice "to
marry is an intensely personal decision that alters the course of
an individual's life[, denying] same-sex couples this choice prohib-
its them from participating fully in our society, which is precisely
the type of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
countenance."152
C. The Fourth Circuit Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Judge Niemeyer maintained the case was about
whether a "[s]tate's decision not to recognize same-sex marriage
violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution[, so
the] judicial response must be limited to an analysis applying es-
tablished constitutional principles."' He criticized the majority
for declaring, "ipse dixit, that the 'fundamental right to marry en-
compasses the right to same-sex marriage' and is thus protected
by" substantive due process because the jurists expressly "by-
passe[d] the relevant constitutional analysis" which Glucksberg
requires by stating it is "not necessary because no new fundamen-
tal right is being recognized."5"' Judge Niemeyer deemed the
analysis "fundamentally flawed," as it did not consider that the
"marriage," which the Court has long recognized "as a fundamen-
tal right is distinct from the newly proposed relationship of a
'same-sex marriage.""'5 He also criticized the majority for failing
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). It was not about whether judges "favor or
disfavor same-sex marriage" or state choices are "good policy decisions." Id.
154. Id. at 385-86 (quoting id. at 376 (majority opinion)); see Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (establishing a two-step analysis for substantive due
process claims by determining: (1) whether the right is deeply rooted in tradition and (2)
articulating an appropriate description of the asserted liberty interest).
155. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 386 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing).
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to "explain how this new notion became incorporated into the tra-
ditional definition of marriage except by linguistic manipula-
tion."'" The dissent, thus, contended that "the majority never
asks the question necessary to finding a fundamental right-
whether same-sex marriage is a right that is 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it was] sacrificed.""'" Judge Niemeyer asserted, were the majori-
ty to "recognize and address the distinction between the two rela-
tionships-the traditional one and the new one-as it must, it
would simply be unable to reach the conclusion that it has
reached."'" He respectfully found that "Virginia was well within
its constitutional authority to adhere to its traditional definition
of marriage .... 
The jurist asserted that substantive due process only protected
fundamental liberty interests, which the Court defined in
Glucksberg.'0 In ascertaining whether there was a fundamental
right, he instructed that courts must always carefully describe
the claimed liberty interest, which must be characterized "in its
narrowest terms."16 ' When judges identify rights as fundamental,
courts apply strict scrutiny, which "is extremely difficult for a law
to withstand[, so the Court has admonished that jurists] be ex-
tremely cautious in recognizing fundamental rights because doing
so ordinarily removes freedom of choice from the hands of the
people."
156. Id. He found the failure "even more pronounced by the majority's acknowledge-
ment that same-sex marriage is a new notion that has not been recognized 'for most of our
country's history."' Id. (citation omitted).
157. Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
158. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 386 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 389; see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21.
161. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 389 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing). But see Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) (major-
ity opinion) (explicitly rejecting the notion that Fourteenth Amendment liberty involving
marriage must be viewed narrowly); infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
162. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom.
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).
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Judge Niemeyer asserted that the plaintiffs and the majority
"recognize that narrowly defining the asserted liberty interest
would require them to demonstrate a new fundamental right to
same-sex marriage, which they cannot do" and, thus did not "ar-
gue that same-sex marriage is, 'objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.""" He claimed they instead contended that the
"fundamental right to marriage that has previously been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court is a broad right that should apply to
the plaintiffs without the need to recognize a new fundamental
right to same-sex marriage[, arguing] the Supreme Court did not
narrowly define the right to marriage in" Loving, Turner, or
Zablocki.'" The jurist admitted the Supreme Court did not recog-
nize a new fundamental right to fit the facts in the specific cases,
but was not required to do so, as each "involved a couple asserting
a right to enter into a traditional marriage."' Thus, no case that
plaintiffs cited and on which the majority relied implicated the
"assertion of a brand new liberty interest."'6 6 He asserted that "to
now define the previously recognized fundamental right to 'mar-
riage' as a concept that includes the new notion of 'same-sex mar-
riage' amounts to a dictionary jurisprudence, which defines terms
as convenient to attain an end."'
Judge Niemeyer acknowledged that "same-sex and opposite-sex
relationships share many attributes[, but] there are also signifi-
cant distinctions . . . that can justify differential treatment by
lawmakers."' Thus, he found when the Court has recognized a
fundamental right to marry, it has "emphasized the procreative
and social ordering aspects of traditional marriage."6 9 Because he
found that there were "fundamental differences between tradi-
tional and same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs and the majority err
by conflating the two relationships under the loosely drawn ru-
bric of 'the right to marriage.""'o To "bridge the obvious differ-
163. Id. at 390 (citation omitted). Niemeyer said they recognized it as a recent devel-
opment. Id. (citation omitted).
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 390-91.
167. Id. at 391.
168. Id. These include producing children and creating a biological family unit. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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ences between" the relationships, the judge claimed that the
plaintiffs relied heavily on Loving to "argue that the fundamental
right to marriage 'has always been based on, and defined by, the
constitutional liberty to select the partner of one's choice.""' Judge
Niemeyer claimed that Loving fails to suggest an "unrestricted
right to marry whomever one chooses," but simply held that mari-
tal restrictions could not be premised on race.172 He asserted that
"[t]o stretch Loving's holding to say that the right to marry is not
limited by gender and sexual orientation is to ignore the inextri-
cable, biological link between marriage and procreation that the
Supreme Court has always recognized."173 Thus, the jurist con-
tended the majority and the district court erred by interpreting
the "Court's marriage cases as establishing a right that includes
same-sex marriage."
In short, Judge Niemeyer claimed that the "fundamental right
to marriage does not include a right to same-sex marriage," and
"[u]nder the Glucksberg analysis .. . there is no new fundamental
right to same-sex marriage.""' Thus, he stated that Virginia's
laws must "be upheld if there is any rational basis for the laws."'
Judge Niemeyer instructed that rational basis review required
courts to give legislatures "heavy deference" and to simply "de-
termine whether the classification in question is, at a minimum,
rationally related to legitimate governmental goals.""' Moreover,
under this review, statutes bear a "strong presumption of validi-
ty, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classifica-
tion have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which
might support [them]."" He reviewed Virginia's reasons for the
laws, which included that opposite-sex marriages provide a "fami-
ly structure by which to nourish and raise ... children, .. . that a
171. Id. at 391-92.
172. Id. at 392 (asserting that Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), supported this reading of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)).
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. He also claimed the plaintiffs ignored the problem of extending marital rights
to relationships states now restrict. Id.
175. Id. at 393.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. (citation omitted).
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biological family is a more stable environment, and [renouncing]
any interest in encouraging same-sex marriage[s].""'
The jurist observed that states could "selectively provide bene-
fits to only certain groups when providing those same benefits to
other groups would not further the State's ultimate goals."80 He
proclaimed that recognizing same-sex marriages would not ad-
vance Virginia's "interest in ensuring stable families in the event
of unplanned pregnancies.""' The judge considered Virginia's ar-
gument that "marriage is a '[c]omplex social institution' with a
'set of norms, rules, patterns, and expectations that powerful-
ly ... affect ... people's choices, actions, and perspectives"' and
"that discarding the traditional definition of marriage will have
far-reaching consequences that cannot easily be predicted."' He
asserted that "legislative choices 'may be based on rational specu-
lation unsupported by evidence or empirical data"' under rational
basis review and that legislatures were better equipped than
courts to make these assessments and plot courses of action based
on predictions."
Judge Niemeyer declared that "Virginia has undoubtedly artic-
ulated sufficient rational bases for its marriage laws, and [he]
would find that those bases constitutionally justify the laws."184
Because the judge determined that "Virginia's marriage laws are
rationally related to its legitimate purposes, they withstand ra-
tional-basis scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.""'
The jurist treated equal protection, as he decided the laws in-
fringed no fundamental right."' Judge Niemeyer explained the
levels of scrutiny but said "when a regulation adversely affects
members of a class that is not suspect or quasi-suspect, the regu-
lation is 'presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classi-
fication drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
179. Id.
180. Id. at 394.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 394-95.
183. Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
184. Id. They are "grounded on the biological connection of men and women; the poten-
tial for their having children; the family order needed in raising children; and, on a larger
scale, the political order resulting from stable family units." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 398. The majority did not address this, as it found that right. Id. at 374-77
(majority opinion).
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state interest.""" Although the plaintiffs urged that Virginia's
laws "should be subjected to some level of heightened scrutiny be-
cause they discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation . .. nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has ever applied
heightened scrutiny to a classification based on sexual orienta-
tion."'" The judge evaluated Romer, Windsor, and a Fourth Cir-
cuit case and found these and the "vast majority of" appellate
courts had applied rational basis review.'" Thus, following this
precedent, he "would hold that Virginia's marriage laws are sub-
ject to rational-basis review . . . [and] conclude that there is a ra-
tional basis for the laws."90
Judge Niemeyer summarized by observing he strongly disa-
greed "with the assertion that same-sex marriage is subject to the
same constitutional protections as the traditional right to mar-
ry."'' Because the dissenter ascertained that "there is no funda-
mental right to same-sex marriage and there are rational reasons
for not recognizing it," he concluded that the federal judiciary
"must allow the States to enact legislation on the subject in ac-
cordance with their political processes." 92
The Fourth Circuit majority denied the defendants' request for
a stay.'"' However, those parties promptly requested a stay from
the Supreme Court that granted it, while they and the Attorney
General expeditiously filed appeals with the Supreme Court.194
The Justices denied all petitions for certiorari in Bostic on Octo-
ber 6, and marriages began in Virginia shortly thereafter.'
Governor Terry McAuliffe, Attorney General Mark Herring,
and numerous additional state and local officials across the
Commonwealth quickly instituted efforts that would fully imple-
187. Id. at 396 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 396-97.
190. Id. at 398.
191. Id.
192. Id. He mounted a strong defense of the laws, but the Supreme Court majority will
probably apply Windsor's reasoning to invalidate state bans. See infra note 217 and ac-
companying text.
193. Order, Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167(L) (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014) (denying stay).
194. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32 (Aug. 20, 2014) (granting stay); see Alan Rappe-
port, Supreme Court Delays Gay Marriage in Virginia, A Day Before It Was Set to Begin,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, at A12.
195. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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ment the judicial mandate. For example, Governor McAuliffe
promulgated an executive order instructing state agencies and
employees to accord couples in same-sex marriages all of the ben-
efits throughout numerous critical areas, including health care,
taxation, and adoption, that opposite-sex couples possess.' The
issuance of marriage licenses by clerk of court offices appeared to
function rather smoothly because a number made concerted ef-
forts to comply, and the seven months required to complete the
appeals granted most a lengthy time to prepare and to anticipate
potential difficulties by initiating efficacious systems."'
In sum, Judge Wright Allen concluded that the Virginia mar-
riage laws proscribing same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and enjoined their application, and a Fourth Circuit
panel majority affirmed her determination. With the Supreme
Court's October 6, 2014 denial of certiorari petitions seeking re-
view of Bostic,' marriage equality came to Virginia. The next
section extracts lessons from the litigation that challenged the
marriage laws.
III. LESSONS
Numerous lessons can be derived from the story of how mar-
riage equality arrived in Virginia. Marriage equality's realization
in the Commonwealth entailed a number of important practical
and symbolic effects. The most critical pragmatic impact is that
thousands of same-sex couples and families, especially the chil-
dren whom these couples rear, will now be relieved of "stigma,
humiliation, and prejudice" and enjoy the many tangible and in-
tangible benefits that marriage affords.' Tangible advantages
include economic benefits and security, namely marriage's conse-
196. See Exec. Order No. 30 (Oct. 7, 2014); see also Statement of Att'y Gen. Herring on
Marriage Equality in Va. (Oct. 6, 2014) (detailing the work with local clerks to begin issu-
ing marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
197. John Woodrow Cox, Same-Sex Couples Quickly and Joyously Wed in Va., WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 2014, at B01; Jim Nolan, McAuliffe Orders Agencies to Comply with Same-
Sex Marriage, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/vir
ginia/articleaad77blO-8bl4-5dl4-807b-0b36344c6791.html.
198. See supra note 36.
199. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bo-
gan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); supra notes 73, 76, 81, 138,
152 and accompanying text.
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quences for taxation and health care, and adoption of children.200
The intangible advantages encompass respect, stability, compan-
ionship, legitimacy, emotional and psychological support, and
201recognition.
Marriage equality also yielded crucial symbolic effects. Virginia
has been a defendant in multiple landmark cases involving social
change over the last six decades. Illustrative were lawsuits that
sought to dismantle segregation in public facilities, especially
schools,202 remove impediments restricting voting,203 terminate the
204ban on interracial marriage, and permit admission of women to
Virginia Military Institute.2 05 The invocation of those and other
relevant case precedents by Judge Allen and Judge Floyd demon-
strated their appreciation of marriage equality's critical symbolic
value.206
Insofar as marriage equality advocates pursued a national liti-
gation strategy, the evaluation above suggests that Virginia fig-
ured prominently in this endeavor. Because the South and the
Rocky Mountain West could generally seem less amenable to
marriage equality than other regions, namely the West Coast and
the Northeast, equality's champions might have perceived Virgin-
ia as comparatively hospitable to marriage equality. For instance,
200. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 658.
201. See id.
202. Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), was a Virginia
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 480-507 (1975) (analyzing the Davis case); Robert B.
McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40 VA. L. REV. 697, 706-25 (1954) (discussing
case law surrounding desegregation of public facilities such as golf courses and swimming
pools).
203. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966); see David Schultz &
Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 375 (2011).
204. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967); see Akhil Reed Amar, The Warren
Court and the Constitution (with Special Emphasis on Brown and Loving), 67 SMU L.
REV. 671, 683 (2014); Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage
Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1102 (2014); see also supra
notes 42, 68, 115, 123 and accompanying text.
205. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996); see David S. Cohen & Nan-
cy Levit, Still Unconstitutional: Our Nation's Experiment with State-Sponsored Sex Segre-
gation in Education, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 339, 348-49 (2014); Rosemary Salomone,
Rights and Wrongs in the Debate over Single-Sex Schooling, 93 B.U. L. REV. 971, 972
(2013); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., supra notes 68-69, 114, 116, 152 and accompanying text.
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the Commonwealth is the northernmost Southern jurisdiction,
rather centrist politically, a state within the relatively moderate
Fourth Circuit, and Virginia has been the defendant in much
pathbreaking litigation over social policy questions. These ideas
explain why Bostic was one of the first cases pursued and decided
after the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Windsor, why it has
been central to the nationwide marriage equality initiative, and
why Virginia became the first southern jurisdiction in which a
court recognized marriage equality.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Virginia
Virginia state and local officials, encompassing the governor
and the attorney general, should keep fully implementing the ju-
dicial mandate, which the Bostic litigation enunciated, by guar-
anteeing that same-sex couples and their families, particularly
children, receive treatment identical to opposite-sex couples and
their families by facilitating thorough marriage equality. The ini-
tial endeavors attempting to implement the Bostic opinion have
proved valuable; however, officers throughout the Commonwealth
must redouble their efforts to insure that the promise of compre-
hensive marriage equality does become a reality.20 7
The General Assembly ought to conduct a thorough review of
the Virginia Code and revise all strictures that it determines pre-
vent same-sex couples from enjoying full marriage equality,20 s but
numerous legislators have apparently chosen to await final Su-
preme Court disposition.2 The Virginia judiciary should corre-
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 208-09.
208. State departments and agencies, with assistance from the Attorney General's of-
fice, have apparently conducted thorough reviews of pertinent rules and regulations while
eliminating or modifying any that limit marriage equality for same-sex couples. See supra
notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
209. Jenna Portnoy, Same-Sex Marriage in Virginia Is Legal, but Maneuvering Rages
on in Richmond, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/vir
ginia-politics/same-sex-marriage-is-legal-in-virginia-but-maneuvering-rages-on-in-richmon
d/2015/01/12/61a3057c-9530-11e4-927a-4fa2638cd1b0_story.html; see Garrett Epps, Mar-
riage Equality Without Equivocation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/01/marriage-equality-without-equivocation/384999; Resistance
Bands, ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerical
2015/02/gay-marriage; supra note 15; infra note 212. The ban on same-sex couple adop-
tions is an obvious example. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1232 (2012); Laura Kebede, Lesbian
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spondingly be receptive to legal actions that people who are in or
wish to enter or exit same-sex marriages pursue. For example,
the Commonwealth's appellate tribunals could generally treat
LGBT persons similarly to heterosexual individuals and couples
when entertaining divorce and custody litigation.2 10
Observers in some jurisdictions, apart from Virginia, have ex-
pressed concern that marriage equality could permit actions that
infringe upon the religious liberty of marriage equality opponents
who favor a heterosexual view of marriage. Illustrations encom-
pass judicial officials, staff in clerk of the court offices responsible
for issuing marriage licenses, bakers, florists, and wedding plan-
ners whom the states might ostensibly force to participate in ac-
tivities, namely same-sex marriages, which violate their religious
beliefs.211 Minimal concrete evidence indicates that analogous be-
havior has occurred in Virginia thus far. Should evidence of this
conduct be adduced, the General Assembly ought to collect, ana-
lyze and synthesize pertinent data and, if the information shows
that problems exist, consider legislative solutions that promise to
remedy the difficulties.2 12
Couple Wins Right to Have Names on Children's Birth Certificates, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.richmond.cominews/virginia/article-de7cfa92-72aa-5dl9-835b-
f87853b07ala.html.
210. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (2006), may intimate this.
211. Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Renew Fight to Stop Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015, at Al; Leonard Pitts, Jr., Bakeries Now Battleground in Same-Sex
Marriage Front, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/
contributors/2015/01/29/gay-marriage-cake-wars-sex/22526991/; see Robin Fretwell Wil-
son, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Protection, 64 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (2014); supra note 209 and accompanying text.
212. Wilson, supra note 211; see SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). Lawmakers have introduced
some bills, but none have passed. See, e.g., S. J. Res. 283 (Va. 2015); H.B. 1414 (Va. 2015);
see also Michael Barbaro and Erik Eckholm, Right to Deny Service to Gays Stirs Broad
Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2015, at Al (explaining the adverse public reaction to the
passage of an Indiana law that many believe would permit discrimination against homo-
sexuals); Robert T. Garrett, Texas Lawmakers Pushing Back Against Gay Rights Success,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-pol
itics/20150204-texas-lawmakers-pushing-back-against-gay-rights-successes.ece (explain-
ing how gay rights successes have affected the political lawmaking climate in Texas);
Portnoy, supra note 209 (commenting on the partisan political dynamics and potential leg-
islation as a result of the change in same-sex marriage legality); Markus Schmidt, House
Panel Scraps Marshall's Bill on Licensees, Gays, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan., 29, 2015),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginialarticle_1cda4826-3936-5f56-a3b3-f2217cl34487.
html (reporting that a House panel defeated a proposed legislation that "would allow any-
one holding a state license, including business owners, lawyers and doctors, to deny ser-
vices to gay people without facing disciplinary action"); Mark Joseph Stern, A New Virgin-
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B. United States
Writers have asserted that the Supreme Court's October 6 de-
cision to reject certiorari petitions in the Fourth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuit appeals indicated the Justices would not review
lower court decisions until a circuit upheld a same-sex marriage
ban, as the Sixth Circuit recently did.213 These predictions seemed
prescient when the Justices accepted the Sixth Circuit appeals in
January.2 14 The Fifth Circuit heard arguments on Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Texas appeals in early 2015, but it may not issue an
opinion quickly enough for the Court to resolve the question dur-
ing the 2014 Term.215
The unclear status of marriage equality shows that the Justic-
es properly decided to grant the Sixth Circuit appeals. When the
appellate court ruled that Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Ten-
nessee bans were constitutional, it prompted a "circuit split," fos-
tering diverse legal regimes in those states and much of the na-
tion's remainder. This patchwork, with marriages invalid for
certain jurisdictions and legal in others, dramatically affects the
lives of "real" people. 2 16 Examples are the 300 Michigan and 1300
Utah same-sex couples who married before higher courts stayed
district opinions invalidating bans.217 Rejection of the Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuit certiorari petitions analogously
ia Bill Would Let Schools, Hotels, Restaurants and Hospitals Turn Gays Away, SLATE
(Jan. 8, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/01/08/virginia-anti
gay-bill-wouldlet schools and hospitals-turngays-away.html (staunchly challenging
the proposed bill, before it had been scrapped, which would attach a "conscience clause" to
licenses and certificates obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia, effectively allowing
individuals to refuse service on the basis of moral or religious opposition); Laura Vozzella,
McAuliffe Invites Firms Troubled by Indiana Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2015, at B5 (re-
porting on Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe's appeal to businesses to relocate to Virginia
in the wake of backlash over Indiana's religious freedom law).
213. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571); Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage: A
Simple Appeal, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
11/same-sex-marriage-a-simple-appeall; supra note 36 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 15, 36.
215. See supra note 28.
216. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410 (expressing concern for real people).
217. Caspar v. Snyder, No. 14-CV-11499, 2015 WL 224741, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 2015);
Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014); see Paul Egan, Appellate Court
Reverse Course, Issues Temporary Stay on Same-Sex Marriages Until Wednesday, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Mar. 22, 2014), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140322/NEWSO6/30322
0063/6th-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-same-sex-gay-marriage-stay-Schuette.
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means thousands of same-sex couples who recently married or
could wed in the future experience "legal limbo."218 Thus, the Jus-
tices correctly agreed to hear the Sixth Circuit appeals, because
many persons need their marital status clarified and protracted
treatment will keep injuring the same-sex couples and their chil-
dren and prolong uncertainty.
The Court might resolve the marriage equality issue in a num-
ber of ways. It could apply to state bans reasoning like that the
Windsor majority employed when invalidating section three of
DOMA, as Justice Scalia foresaw.' No persuasive contention dif-
ferentiates the situations, and Windsor suggested that individual
rights trump federalism even respecting the marriage definition
that the states conventionally regulated.220 The Court may also
invoke Equal Protection Clause analysis, as did the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits and Judge Wright Allen, by considering bans a
form of sexual orientation discrimination, which receives elevated
*221scrutiny.
If a majority finds these paths unconvincing or requiring too
significant doctrinal modification, it could follow other, putatively
narrower, avenues. The Justices might deem bans gender dis-
218. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Ginnie Graham, More Than
3,200 Same-Sex Couples Marry in Oklahoma in Less Than Three Months, TULSA WORLD
(Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/ginniegraham/more-than-same-sex-coupl
es-marry-in-oklahoma-in-less/articledd39267c-093f-5dl3-a675-734b11637659.html. They
will be in limbo until the Justices decide. Should the Court uphold bans, judges will ap-
parently recognize their marriages. See Caspar, 2015 WL 224741, at *26.
219. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
220. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-92 (2013); Bos-
tic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. Bostic,
135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1228
(10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (U.S. Oct. 6,
2014) (No. 14-124); see Franklin supra note 5 at 871 n.248. It might use heightened scru-
tiny and find that the dignity, economic, and other injuries which bans impose violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
221. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657-59 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bo-
gan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456,
467-68 (9th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480-83 (E.D. Va. 2014). Bos-
tic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v.
Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225), and Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1208-22,
partly used the "rights," not the "classification," equal protection strand. The Court may
conclude bans fail this test, as the responsible procreation and "wait and see" rationales
are insufficiently important state interests or the heterosexual-only classification has no
substantial relationship to their attainment. It might even hold that bans lack a rational
basis. See supra note 10 (Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit majority opinions).
But see supra note 10 (Fourth and Tenth Circuit dissents).
1226 [Vol. 49:1193
MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN VIRGINIA
crimination under equal protection that warrant intermediate re-
view, because they facially classify on the basis of sex and are
premised on gender stereotypes.22 2 The Court as well may employ
a Due Process Clause approach-similar to notions the Fourth
and Tenth Circuits and Judge Wright Allen used-by recognizing
same-sex couples' fundamental right to marry, which enjoys strict
scrutiny.223 The Justices might correspondingly determine that
bans contravene liberty under due process, as Windsor, Lawrence
v. Texas, and the Bostic circuit and district court opinions inti-
mated.224
In the final analysis, multiple routes now lead to marriage
equality.2 More specifically, in rejecting the states' narrow defi-
nition of the fundamental right to marry-as espoused by Judge
Niemeyer in his dissent in Bostic22 -the Court should rely on its
decisions in Casey227 and Lawrence,"22 which directly rejected the
"narrowest-historical-context approach" enunciated by footnote
six of the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.2" There-
222. Latta, 771 F.3d at 485-90 (Berzon, J., concurring); see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky
Arguments in Social Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage
Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2109-10 (2014); Leslie, supra note 204, at 1089-95. It
may find bans fail that test, as the rationales tendered are not sufficiently important gov-
ernment interests or the classification lacks a substantial relationship to achieving them.
223. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-77, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub.
nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Kitchen, 755 F.3d
at 1229-30; Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472-73, 483-84 (E.D. Va. 2014). But see
supra note 15 (Fourth and Tenth Circuit dissents). It could decide that bans do not sur-
vive, as the reasons proffered are not compelling or the classification lacks narrow tailor-
ing to their realization.
224. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2692-93; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 566-67, 578-79 (2003); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-77 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Bostic
v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471-73 (E.D. Va. 2014); see Franklin, supra note 5, at 881-
89; Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-50 (2011).
225. Many doctrinal tests seem satisfied. David Cruz, Symposium: Unveiling Marriage
Equality?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2015, 6:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/
symposium-unveiling-marriage-equality. Homosexuality cases may eschew them. Frank-
lin, supra note 5, at 871-72, 881; see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Funda-
mental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2003).
226. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
227. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) ("It is ...
tempting. . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined
at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference ... when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.... But such a view would be inconsistent with
our law . . . .").
228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
229. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
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fore, the Court should broadly define the right to marriage as
that of two people to marry, rather than a narrow right of same-
sex marriage.
CONCLUSION
Marriage equality swept the nation across 2014, and Virginia
proved essential to that development. Judge Wright Allen's com-
prehensive decision, which invalidated same-sex marriage pro-
scriptions, and the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of her opinion,
have brought marriage equality to Virginia and given new mean-
ing to the promises of liberty and equality articulated in Loving
nearly a half century ago. This has enabled same-sex couples and
their families, particularly their children, to realize innumerable
valuable advantages that Virginia formerly bestowed only upon
opposite-sex couples. Because marriage equality has not yet come
to some jurisdictions, including a number of which where judges
have found bans constitutional, thereby permitting different mar-
riage regimes across the nation, the Justices must promptly re-
solve this critical issue.
230. For a full treatment of this argument, see Brief for Commonwealth of Va. as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-25, Obergefell v. Hodges, - U.S. _ (2015) (Nos.
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Laurence H. Tribe and
Michael C. Dorf in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, _ U.S. - (2015) (Nos. 14-
556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
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